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Background: As medicines are becoming more targeted and complex in the U.S., ensuring patients’ safe use of
medications with known dangerous risks is critical for public health and safety. Therefore, the Risk Evaluation and
Mitigation Strategies (REMS) program is more important than ever. The REMS programs mandates that manufacturers
utilize tools to manage known or potential serious risks (e.g., death, severe birth defects, prolonged hospitalization)
associated with certain drugs while still making these medications available to patients with unmet medical needs. Yet,
recently federal policy makers have proposed legislation to force manufacturers to sell medications with known serious
risks in a manner that weakens the medications’ REMS programs.
Methods: The author reviewed U.S. legislation, statutes, case law, government agency policies and guidelines,
scholarly articles, and news stories published between January 1, 2004 and December 1, 2015 and provided legal
and policy analysis.
Results: REMS are necessary to make medications with known severe risks available to certain patient populations for
whom treatment may not be available otherwise.
Conclusion: In order to ensure that proper safety measures are preserved and medications with known risks are not
diverted to parties who will not follow safety requirements, legislation should not be passed to require a forced sale of
drugs subject to REMS with restricted distribution for bioequivalence testing purposes. Generic manufacturers must be
held to the same REMS safety standards as brand manufacturers. Systems currently in place adequately balance risk and
safety.
Keywords: FDA, Risk evaluation and mitigation strategies, REMS, Restricted distribution, Safety, Drugs, Pharmaceuticals
Introduction
Over the years, certain medicines approved by the
U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) have
caused significant adverse events once they entered
the market, resulting in the need for a regulatory re-
sponse [1]. One of the best known examples is rofe-
coxib (Vioxx), the nonsteroidal anti-inflammatory
drug (NSAID) that treated adults with arthritis and
other painful conditions. FDA approved the medica-
tion in May 1999 because it allegedly caused fewer
ulcers and less gastrointestinal bleeding than its com-
petitor, naproxen [2]. However, as early as November
1999, a study of 4,000 patients reported that 79 pa-
tients taking rofecoxib either died or developed ser-
ious heart problems, compared with 41 patients
taking naproxen [3]. By the time the manufacturer
voluntarily withdrew rofecoxib from the market in
2004, the drug had contributed to more than 60,000
heart attack and stroke-related deaths [4].
With situations like the one surrounding rofecoxib as the
impetus, Congress passed the Food and Drug Administra-
tion Amendments Act of 2007 (FDAAA), expanding FDA’sCorrespondence: sworthy@aimedalliance.org
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authority to regulate the nation’s drug safety system.
Taking effect on March 25, 2008, the FDAAA gave
FDA broad powers to control drug marketing and la-
beling, require post-approval studies, establish active
surveillance systems, and make clinical trial opera-
tions and results more visible to the public [5].
One notable component of the FDAAA was the Risk
Evaluation and Mitigation Strategy (REMS) initiative,
which provided a new avenue for FDA to approve
drugs and biologics that may otherwise have been held
up indefinitely due to potential safety concerns [5].
Defined as a “strategy to manage a known or potential
serious risk associated with a drug or biological prod-
uct,” REMS is a mandatory plan that includes risk
minimization strategies beyond standard approved la-
beling to ensure the benefits of a medication outweigh
its risks [6]. REMS includes, among other components,
medication safety guides, patient package inserts, commu-
nications plans, Elements To Assure Safe Use (ETASU),
and implementation systems used to monitor, evaluate,
and improve application of ETASU [5]. ETASU is the
strictest category of REMS and may include restricted dis-
tribution systems, which ensure only specifically approved
parties have access to the drug under strictly controlled
conditions [5].
According to FDAAA, medicines carrying serious
risks would be removed from the market altogether
without ETASU, leaving certain patient populations
without treatment. Yet, critics erroneously argue that
brand manufacturers have inappropriately used REMS
with ETASU to limit generic manufacturers’ access to
quantities of innovator drugs to support bioequiva-
lence testing, a preliminary step in generic drug
development [7]. Consequently, Congress has contem-
plated legislation on several occasions that would
force the sale of brand medicines approved with
rigorous REMS safeguards to generic manufacturers
for bioequivalence testing without sufficient controls
to prevent harmful exposure. Although such legisla-
tion has failed in the past, it is again under consider-
ation by the 114th Congress.
At a time when medicines are becoming more tar-
geted and complex, ensuring patients’ safe use of med-
ications with known dangerous risks is critical for
public health and safety. Therefore, it is vital that pol-
icy makers guard closely the drug safety protections
REMS make possible while allowing brand and generic
manufacturers to negotiate the sale of samples for bio-
equivalence testing. To document why the current sys-
tem should not be weakened, this article provides an
up-to-date analysis of the REMS program, including
its history, the REMS approval process, and enforce-
ment mechanisms. The article then discusses new
challenges to REMS that may create unjustified risks
to patient safety. It concludes by making recommen-
dations to preserve ETASU, and restricted distribution
in particular, as a component of REMS.
Background
Overview of the REMS program
Prescription drug safety is a significant concern for
millions of Americans who take medications to treat
and manage their diseases or disorders [1]. Under the
Food, Drug, and Cosmetics Act (FDCA), FDA is re-
sponsible for ensuring that all prescription medica-
tions are both safe and effective for patient use [1].
Accordingly, FDA’s safety decisions are grounded in
the individual context of each drug, such as the nature
and severity of the disease that the medication treats
and the availability of alternative treatments [1]. In
some instances, the only medications available to treat
certain disorders may have serious inherent risks or
cause severe adverse events, such as birth defects or
organ damage, when not handled and administered
with utmost care [6]. In these situations, FDA must
determine whether the benefit of the medication out-
weighs the risk to the patient [5].
With the enactment of FDAAA in 2007, Congress ex-
panded FDA’s powers to assure the safety of prescrip-
tion medicines. This included new authority to require
REMS to manage known or potential serious risks asso-
ciated with certain drugs while still making these medi-
cations available to patients with unmet medical needs
[1, 8]. The REMS program allows FDA to approve a
drug that would otherwise be denied approval due to
safety issues [9]. Therefore, FDA’s expanded authority is
meant to strengthen its ability to safeguard the public,
and it gives the agency options when serious risks are
discovered after a drug has been approved and brought
to market [10].
FDA determines whether a REMS is required either
during or after the approval process [11]. In evaluating
the necessity of REMS, FDA will consider the following
elements:
 Whether the drug is a new molecular entity;
 Seriousness of the disease or condition that the drug
treats;
 Expected benefit of the drug;
 Expected or actual duration of treatment;
 Estimated size of the population likely to use the
drug;
 Seriousness of any known or potential adverse
events related to the drug; and
 History of such incidences [5].
If FDA decides the risk-benefit profile warrants a
REMS, the agency will require the manufacturer to
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submit a REMS proposal containing goals, elements,
tools, and an assessment plan [5]. Following implemen-
tation of the REMS plan, the manufacturer must submit
assessments on whether the REMS plan is meeting its
goals or requires modifications [5]. In order to ensure
the continuing adequacy of REMS plans, FDA assesses
each plan on a periodic basis [5]. FDA can make modifi-
cations to strengthen a REMS when needed, eliminate
elements that have proven to be overly restrictive, or re-
lease a REMS altogether [12].
Additionally, the FDAAA provides FDA with en-
forcement mechanisms for REMS violations [11]. If
a manufacturer fails to comply with the require-
ments of its approved REMS, the drug may be
deemed misbranded and removed from the market,
and any responsible party may be subject to civil
monetary penalties ranging from $250,000 to $10,000,000
[13, 14].
In 2012, Congress reaffirmed the importance of
REMS by enacting the Food and Drug Administration
and Safety Innovation Act (FDASIA) [15]. FDASIA re-
quired FDA to measure the effectiveness of REMS, con-
tinue to develop techniques to standardize REMS, and
integrate REMS into the existing and evolving health
care system [15].
FDA’s use of REMS has changed with experience
Since FDA implemented the REMS program in 2008,
the agency has evolved in its use of REMS safeguards.
Recognizing that REMS drugs represent a unique set
of important medicines, FDA decided to streamline
its REMS authority to concentrate on mitigating the
risks of only the most potentially dangerous drugs.
Therefore, in 2011, the agency began to release 145
less potentially toxic drugs from their REMS require-
ments out of the 222 REMS programs originally au-
thorized [16]. As of October 2015, only 72 products
have unique REMS programs in place, while six clas-
ses of products share REMS [17]. At the same time,
just 12 of the 107 new medicines approved since
2012 required an authorized REMS program. This il-
lustrates that the agency authorizes REMS only when
necessary to protect patients from potentially severe
adverse events.
Elements to assure safe use & restricted distribution
Given that REMS are intended to address the safety
concerns regarding a specific medication, REMS ele-
ments are commensurate with the severity of risk [5].
To limit undue burdens on patient access, REMS pro-
grams must be compatible with established distribu-
tion, procurement, and dispensing systems for drugs
and conform to plans for other drugs with compar-
able serious risks.
In situations where medicines have serious risks,
FDA may require Elements To Assure Safe Use
(ETASU), which are highly stringent safety precau-
tions as part of the REMS initiative. Limited to situa-
tions where FDA determines that, due to a medicine’s
“inherent toxicity or potential harmfulness,” the medi-
cation can only be approved with rigorous controls to
ensure a serious or fatal risk can be avoided by
proper use, these carefully planned safety protocols
are the most extensive REMS elements [18]. As such,
ETASU provide an avenue for patients with serious
diseases and debilitating conditions to be treated ef-
fectively with drugs and biologics that would other-
wise not be on the market.
Specifically, ETASU elements may require any or all of
the following:
 That prescribers have specific training, experience,
or special certifications;
 Pharmacies, practitioners, or health care settings
dispensing the drug be specially certified;
 The drug be dispensed only in certain health care
settings (e.g., hospitals);
 The drug be dispensed with evidence of safe use
conditions, such as laboratory test results;
 Each patient using the drug be subject to
monitoring; and
 Each patient using the drug be enrolled in a
registry [5].
FDA will only approve a medication with ETASU
if, due to an “inherent toxicity or potential harmful-
ness,” ETASU can ensure a serious or fatal risk can
be avoided by proper use. This determination re-
quires an assessment that other elements of REMS,
such as a communication plan, are not sufficient,
thus demonstrating that an FDA-approved medica-
tion necessitating REMS with ETASU is not issued
lightly [5, 14].
Of the REMS drugs with ETASU on the market, a
small number require restricted distribution systems
to ensure that a drug or biologic known to cause
birth defects, organ damage, and other serious or life-
threating events is only acquired and used by patients
under carefully controlled conditions. These systems
may require physician qualification and registration,
pharmacist distribution limitations, patients enrolling
in a registry, and patients undergoing routine testing,
such as women having a monthly pregnancy test [5, 19].
By restricting distribution to certified prescribers and
pharmacists, it is more likely that only clinicians
with a clear understanding of proper usage of the
drug will prescribe it, thereby mitigating known
safety risks [20].
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Given that risk distribution programs must control the
use of a drug or biologic from beginning to end, REMS
with restricted distribution often differ in how they are
prescribed, tracked, and controlled to ensure the safe re-
turn and disposal of unused quantities [1]. For example,
a restricted distribution system may include some form
of an access program in which wholesalers and distribu-
tors must enroll and commit to distributing only to
authorized pharmacies participating in prescription
tracking [21]. In this case, enrolled pharmacies are kept
in databases, and authorized distributors and wholesalers
are required to check the database to confirm that the
pharmacy is an authorized entity to obtain the medica-
tion [21]. The drug manufacturer uses the database to
monitor and evaluate the implementation of the access
program requirements [21].
Samples for bioequivalence testing
For FDA to approve a generic form of a branded drug,
manufacturers must submit an abbreviated new drug ap-
plication (ANDA) demonstrating that the generic ver-
sion is “pharmaceutically equivalent” to the innovator
drug – meaning the drug contains the same active ingre-
dient at the same strength, in the same dosage form
(e.g., pill, capsule), and has the same route of
administration.
Additionally, the manufacturer must establish bio-
equivalence, meaning that the generic version works
in the body the same way, and is as safe and effect-
ive as the branded drug [14, 22]. FDA requires min-
imal trials involving human subjects that show the
generic version performs in the same manner as the
original innovator compound. One frequently used
method is to measure the time it takes the generic
drug to reach the bloodstream. If the generic version
delivers the same amount of active ingredients into a
patient’s bloodstream in the same amount of time as
the original medicine, FDA determines it to be bio-
equivalent [23].
In order to conduct bioequivalence testing, generic
manufacturers must obtain samples of the branded
product to conduct comparison studies [22]. In most sit-
uations, generic companies are able to purchase brand
drug samples from a wholesaler or distributor on the
open market [24]. The problem comes in the rare situa-
tions when drugs are subject to REMS with ETASU and
controlled through restricted distribution systems. In
this instance, generic manufacturers are not authorized
entities and approved wholesalers and distributors would
violate of the terms of the REMS program if they were
to sell samples to an unauthorized party.
Compounding the problem, brand manufacturers
could violate their own REMS program if they shared
samples with generic manufacturers for bioequivalence
testing and face civil penalties [14]. In response to this
problem, FDA issued Draft Guidance: How to Obtain a
Letter from the FDA Stating that Bioequivalence Study
Protocols Contain Safety Protections Comparable to Ap-
plicable REMS for RLD (“Draft Guidance”) in December
2014 [22]. The Draft Guidance explains how generic
manufacturers can obtain samples of REMS drugs from
the branded manufacturer [22]. It states that if the brand
drug is subject to REMS with ETASU, a generic manu-
facturer can request a letter from FDA clarifying that the
brand manufacturer will not violate its product’s REMS
by providing drug samples to a generic manufacturer for
bioequivalence testing [22].
To obtain this letter from FDA, the generic manufac-
turer must prove to the agency that in conducting its
bioequivalence tests, the company’s protocol will incorp-
orate the elements of the brand drug’s labeling and spe-
cific ETASU requirements [22]. In addition, there are
specific responsibilities and liabilities generic manufac-
turers must accept if there is an adverse event. Through
this process, nearly a dozen medicines subject to REMS
have gone generic, including nine that are subject to
stringent ETASU provisions.
Restricted distribution as required by REMS versus restricted
distribution without REMS
It is important to note the distinction between medica-
tions that require restricted distribution as part of their
REMS program and medications that require restricted
distribution but do not have a REMS program. Medica-
tions with REMS have known or potential serious safety
risks, so restricted distribution can ensure that these
medications are only distributed to parties that have
agreed to comply with all of the REMS requirements. In
contrast, medications without REMS may lack such
strong justifications.
In some outlier cases, bad actors may use restricted
distribution for a medication that does not require
REMS as an anti-competition mechanism to drive up
prices. For example, Turing Pharmaceuticals recently
imposed a restricted distribution system for phyri-
methamine, even though the medication had no
REMS program and had a well-characterized safety
profile [25]. Turing then increased the price of the
medication by 5000 % [25]. In this case, the adoption
of the restricted distribution system did not have any
medical justification and was only used to stave off
competition.
Methods
This article presents a study of REMS and legislation intro-
duced to reform the REMS program in the United States.
The analysis draws on diverse sources, including U.S.
Worthy Journal of Pharmaceutical Policy and Practice  (2016) 9:2 Page 4 of 12
legislation, statutes, case law, government agency
policies and guidelines, scholarly articles, and news
stories published between January 1, 2004 and
December 1, 2015.
This study describes the historical development of
the REMS program, the REMS approval process, and
enforcement mechanisms. The author provides legal
and policy analysis to identify new challenges to
REMS that may create unjustified risks to patient
safety. The author then uses that analysis to develop
and propose recommendations to preserve ETASU,
and restricted distribution in particular, as a compo-
nent of REMS.
Results and Discussion
New challenges to REMS are based on inaccurate
information and create unjustified risks to patient
safety
Despite the limited number of branded medicines ap-
proved with REMS requirements, critics have sought
to weaken these safeguards, arguing that brand manu-
facturers use REMS controls, and especially restricted
distribution systems, to prevent generic manufacturers
from obtaining the product samples needed to con-
duct bioequivalence testing. Besides citing the diffi-
culty obtaining samples of drugs subject to restricted
distribution systems through customary distribution
channels, the generic drug industry also alleges that
innovator companies refuse to sell samples to generic
marketers, thereby precluding them from satisfying
FDA-approval requirements [26].
Citing these complaints, the generic drug industry
has pressed for legislation to force brand manufac-
turers to sell samples of products subject to REMS
with restricted distribution systems, and absolve gen-
eric companies from liability should a generic drug
lead to serious injury, birth defects, or death. The
generic manufacturer industry’s allies focus on the po-
tential economic savings to patients from increased
access to generic medicines and overlook the import-
ance of REMS in ensuring the safe use of the small
number of medicines that carry known safety risks
when not carefully controlled.
Dispelling falsehoods from interested parties
Today, millions of Americans with serious diseases
(e.g., cancers, Crohn's disease, bowel disorders,
chronic obstructive pulmonary disease, HIV, lung con-
ditions, multiple sclerosis, seizures, and schizophrenia)
and rare disorders are treated effectively with medica-
tions that may never have been available without
REMS programs to ensure their safe use. However,
eight years have passed since Congress authorized the
REMS program and the sense of urgency that led to
these requirements has been replaced by mispercep-
tions about the need for REMS controls. Therefore,
providing policy makers with up-to-date facts about
the REMS program is critically important to correct
inaccurate statements that are at the heart of the
current REMS debate. Below summarizes specific alle-
gations about the use of REMS programs and
counterarguments.
Falsehood one: restricted distribution is a pretext
To make the case that forced sale legislation is
needed, the Generic Pharmaceutical Association (GPhA)
commissioned Matrix Global Advisors (MGA), an
economic policy consulting firm, to prepare the re-
port entitled Lost Prescription Drug Savings from Use
of REMS Programs to Delay Generic Market Entry
[27]. Issued in July 2014, the report contends that
branded drug manufacturers use REMS safeguards as
a pretext to deny generic manufacturers access to
brand drug samples [26]. However, there are signifi-
cant questions regarding the methodology used to
reach this conclusion.
Even without an examination of the report’s method-
ology, readily available data from FDA dispels the con-
clusions of the MGA report. Explaining the purpose
and intent of the REMS program, FDA states that cer-
tain drugs carrying known, serious risks can only be
approved if the pharmaceutical manufacturer agrees to
implement REMS controls with ETASU, such as re-
stricted distribution systems, due to the drug’s inher-
ent toxicity or potential harmfulness [5]. The agency
defines a “serious risk” as one that results in or places
the patient in danger of death, hospitalization, incap-
acitation or disruption of the ability to conduct nor-
mal life function, congenital anomaly, or a birth defect
[5]. One such example is vigabatrin, an anti-seizure
drug known to cause permanent blindness and sui-
cidal tendencies if the medicine is not used by patients
under carefully controlled conditions [28]. Through
restricted distribution, FDA was able to build in safe-
guards to the REMS program so patients with seizures
could be treated with vigabatrin [5].
However, critics discount the need for these precau-
tions and overlook the potential for drugs carrying
known serious risks to be diverted, by theft or otherwise,
and distributed with no safeguards in place. This is a
growing concern for both regulators and the public
health community in light of a growing black market for
drugs that are obtained through employee pilfering,
pharmacy robberies, theft from patients, and other
means, which are then sold at a profit to unsuspecting
distributors, hospitals, pharmacists, physicians, and
consumers.
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To appreciate the consequences, consider the potential
for harm if ambrisentan, a pulmonary hypertension
drug, were diverted. Because ambrisentan can cause ser-
ious birth defects if taken by a pregnant woman, FDA
requires the manufacturer to operate a restricted distri-
bution system under REMS that entails a monthly preg-
nancy test for women of childbearing age in addition to
other safeguards [29]. Without these controls, diverted
ambrisentan could lead to newborns with severe
deformities.
Critics further ignore the legal precedent for liability
challenges against branded manufacturers if medica-
tion errors are linked to generic forms of high-risk
drugs and biologics [25]. Because generic drugs are
copies of branded medicines, courts have held that
generic manufacturers are not liable for the adverse
events caused by the generic drug; instead, the brand
manufacturer is liable1 [30–32]. Moreover, if a generic
medication yields a significant increase in adverse
events, FDA could also require additional REMS ele-
ments of the innovator company or withdraw the
drug from the market altogether [25]. Such adverse
events associated with the generic product could also
hurt the brand firm’s reputation [25].
In light of these challenges, FDA has stated that the
current liability doctrine “alters incentives for generic
drug manufacturers to comply with current require-
ments to conduct robust post-marketing, surveillance,
evaluation, and reporting, and to ensure that the labeling
for their drugs is accurate and up-to-date [29].” In other
words, this liability rule provides further disincentive for
generic manufacturers to bear the expense of monitoring
the safety of their products and implementing systems
to prevent adverse events.
Falsehood two: a large number of generic medications are
impacted by restricted distribution
REMS programs are rare and only authorized when ne-
cessary to protect patients from potentially severe ad-
verse events. This is especially true for medicines
approved with REMS programs requiring ETASU. Ap-
proximately half the medicines with authorized REMS
programs are subject to ETASU and an even smaller
number require restricted distribution systems.
However, this fact is clouded by inaccurate projec-
tions in the MGA report that “nearly 40 % of new
FDA approvals are subject to REMS, and the percent-
age of REMS programs that require distribution re-
strictions has increased dramatically in the last
several years [26].” To produce this estimate, MGA
applied pre-2011 FDA data, which is now completely
out of date, rendering the findings both misleading
and inaccurate. In 2011, FDA streamlined the REMS
program and released 145 of the 222 medicines
originally approved with REMS requirements, which
the MGA report does not take into account. In taking
this action, FDA was careful to ensure that drugs re-
quiring restricted distribution systems meet specific
FDAAA requirements so the REMS elements com-
mensurate with the specific risks posed by the drug
and are not unduly burdensome to patient access [5].
As a result, only a small number of medications with
REMS have restricted distribution systems.
This process was triggered in November 2011, when
FDA published guidance to allow drug manufacturers to
request removal of their REMS requirements when the
only element is a medication guide [33]. By early 2012,
the agency had released 96 drugs with medication guide-
only REMS and removed medication guides as an elem-
ent from 14 other REMS programs that require a
communications plan [1].
In taking these steps, FDA was careful to ensure
that drugs requiring restricted distribution systems
meet specific FDAAA requirements so the REMS ele-
ments commensurate with the specific risks posed by
the drug and are not unduly burdensome to patient
access [5]. The result is only a small number of medi-
cations are now marketed through restricted distribu-
tion systems.
Also of note, FDA continues to reevaluate medi-
cines with REMS designations, modifying or releasing
REMS requirements when agency officials deem them
no longer necessary [34]. For instance, in February
2011, FDA removed the restricted distribution re-
quirement for two drugs – romiplostim injection and
eltrombopag tablets – after determining some of the
adverse events associated with these medications were
part of the natural history of the illnesses treated by
these drugs [35]. In November 2011, FDA published
guidance to allow drug manufacturers to request re-
moval of their REMS requirements when the only
element is a medication guide [32]. Thus, by early
2012, FDA had released 96 drugs with medication
guide-only REMS and removed medication guides as
an element from 14 other REMS programs that re-
quire a communications plan [1].
As a result of FDA’s actions, the number of
branded drugs that now have authorized unique
REMS programs is not 40 % as MGA claims, but six
percent – or 73 of the 1,161 FDA-approved brand
drugs [36]. Of these 73 medicines, 36 have ETASU
requirements (3 %), and 31 are subject to restricted
distribution (2.5 %) [17]. Therefore, even as FDA
works to increase the number of drug approvals, the
chart below clearly shows that the number of new
medicines requiring restricted distribution remains
very low and has not changed significantly between
2010 and 2014.
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Falsehood three: generic manufacturers have no access to
samples
It is true that drugs requiring restricted distribution sys-
tems are more difficult for generic drug manufacturers to
obtain due to controls over when and to whom the drug
may be sold. However, the assertion in the MGA report
that generic drug manufacturers have no access to medi-
cations for bioequivalence testing due to REMS with re-
stricted distribution is not supported by the facts [26].
Based on current REMS safety protocols, nearly a
dozen medicines subject to REMS requirements have
generic counterparts on the market, including nine sub-
ject to stringent ETASU provisions. This includes gen-
eric versions of three branded testosterone gels and
bupropion hydrochloride [42]. Similarly, Roxane Labora-
tories submitted an application for a generic version of
alosetron hydrochloride, despite the branded drug being
subject to REMS with restricted distribution [43].
Generic manufacturers have also been successful in
testing and receiving FDA clearance to market five
branded drug products that share a single REMS system
[44]. Accordingly, generic versions are now available for
buprenorphine transmucosal products to treat opioid
dependence and four other medicines subject to re-
stricted distribution requirements: isotretinoin to treat
acne; the immunosuppressant drug mycophenolate to
prevent organ rejection after transplant; the diabetes
drug rosiglitazone; and transmucosal immediate release
fentanyl, used to manage breakthrough pain in adults
with cancer.
These approvals are the results of established proce-
dures whereby FDA permits a branded manufacturer to
sell quantities of drugs subject to restricted distribution
to a generic manufacturer for bioequivalence testing.
The requirement in such instances is that generic manu-
facturers make reasonable assurances to FDA and the
branded manufacturer that the drug will be handled, dis-
pensed, and administered safely. In addition, there are
certain responsibilities and liabilities generic manufac-
turers must accept if there is an adverse event.
Falsehood four: lack of samples has resulted in billions of
dollars in avoidable costs
The MGA report projected $5.4 billion a year in U.S.
health care savings if generic versions of select branded
drugs “whose market entry is currently delayed by mis-
use of REMS or other restricted access [p]rograms” are
allowed to come to market [26]. Yet, this conclusion is
conjecture and based on questionable methodology.
To make its projection, MGA researchers surveyed
some of the GPhA member companies (not all partici-
pated in the survey) who identified “brand drugs with
REMS or other restricted access programs reportedly
used to prevent generic manufacturers from accessing
drug samples [26].” There is no explanation in the MGA
report of the criteria used by the survey respondents,
which is problematic. Based on these findings, MGA an-
alyzed 40 unspecified drugs “with programs to block
generic access,” of which only 16 (40 %) actually have
REMS requirements [26]. The other 24 drugs, according
to the report, use “non-REMS restrictions to block ac-
cess,” although the report does not describe the restric-
tions and how they are used [26].
Compounding this flawed analysis, MGA attributes
over 50 % of sales for these 40 brand drugs to four prod-
ucts; yet the report does not state whether these medi-
cines are actually subject to REMS controls [26]. In
calculating the “economic cost of REMS misuse,” MGA
also made the assumption that FDA will approve generic
drug applications for all 40 innovator medicines; how-
ever, there is no guarantee this will occur. For instance,
FDA rejected 18 % of all generic drug applications in
2010 and 15.5 % in 2011 [45]. In 2012, FDA rejected 100
applications (9.4 %), and 40 of those applications were
rejected due to serious bioequivalence deficiencies des-
pite access to samples [44].
Lastly – and of critical importance when approving
medicines known to carry high risks – MGA re-
searchers did not take into account the costs that
would arise if generic manufacturers did not imple-
ment the same rigorous REMS safeguards as the in-
novator company and patients experienced adverse
events. Unfortunately, the reality is these costs could
be substantial, including the possibility that both the
innovator drug and the generic version could be re-
moved from the market.
Forced sale is not permissible under current law
Although REMS has become an essential tool to advance
patient safety, proposed legislation introduced in the
2010 [17, 37] 2011 [17, 38] 2012 [17, 39] 2013 [17, 40] 2014 [17, 41]
# of new FDA-approved drugs 21 30 39 27 41
# of new FDA-approved drugs with REMS with restricted
distribution
1 1 1 5 1
Percentage of new FDA-approved drugs with REMS with
restricted distribution
4.7 % 3.3 % 2.5 % 18.5 % 2.4 %
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114th Congress would undermine the most important
purpose of REMS: Ensuring drugs with potentially dan-
gerous risks are safely accessible only to the appropriate
people. Specifically, the Fair Access to Safe and Timely
(FAST) Generics Act of 2015, introduced on June 18,
2015, would require the “forced sale” of drugs subject to
REMS requirements as samples for bioequivalence
testing [46].
From a patient safety perspective, the implications are
significant: If the forced sale provision were to be
enacted, the changes would undermine necessary drug
safety precautions and create disincentives for the future
development and marketing of higher-risk drugs, espe-
cially to treat rare disorders, due to liability concerns.
Moreover, the proposed legislation raises serious legal
challenges. While FDA has statutory authority to regu-
late REMS and require restricted distribution systems,
no legal authority currently exists to mandate sales to
generic companies [24, 47].
In light of these concerns, when Congress passed
FDAAA, legislators excluded a provision requiring
FDA to mandate that branded manufacturers provide
samples to generic manufacturers for bioequivalence
testing. Similarly, in 2012, lawmakers passed the Food
and Drug Administration Safety and Innovation Act
(FDSIA), which excluded a forced sale provision be-
cause Congress did not want it to lead" to FDA for-
cing drug sales between brand and generic
manufacturers” [48]. Then in 2014, the FAST Ge-
nerics Act was introduced for the first time, which
specifically focused on the forced sale of branded
medicines requiring restricted distribution systems to
ensure safe use to generic manufacturers [45]. The
bill died in committee, but was reintroduced in June
2015 [47].
Reinforcing these actions, FDA has publicly stated its
position on requiring the forced sale of branded drugs to
generic manufacturers for bioequivalence testing.
Responding to a Citizen Petition filed by a generic
manufacturer, the agency rejected the request to estab-
lish procedures to “prevent companies from using REMS
to block or delay generic competition” [49], stating that
market competition issues are best addressed by the
Federal Trade Commission (FTC) [50].
Moreover, through its Draft Guidance on Safety Letters
issued in December 2014, FDA made clear it will not
compel branded manufacturers to sell samples of medi-
cines subject to REMS controls. However, the guidance
clarifies the process by which a generic manufacturer
can obtain a letter from FDA stating the safety protec-
tions proposed for the bioequivalence study are compar-
able to the innovator company’s REMS program. This
letter, in effect, permits the sale of branded drug samples
for bioequivalence testing [51].
The safety implications of legislative proposals to force
the sale of branded drugs subject to REMS requirements
are significant
By forcing the sale of medicines subject to REMS with
restricted distribution for bioequivalence testing, legisla-
tive proposals like the FAST Generics Act present sig-
nificant safety risks that should not be overlooked. This
includes the provision forcing innovators to sell drugs
subject to REMS with ETASU without specific require-
ments for generic manufacturers to implement the same
rigorous safeguards to ensure safe use [45]. The pro-
posed legislation would also nullify the current process
by which FDA permits an innovator company to sell
samples of a REMS drug for bioequivalence testing and
expose the brand manufacturer to liability without giving
the manufacturer the opportunity to mitigate risks or
negotiate indemnity.
Restricted distribution systems controlling the use of high
risk medicines would be weakened
Intended to remove what the generic drug industry per-
ceives as anticompetitive obstacles to faster approval of
more generic medicines, the FAST Generics Act con-
tains language that will significantly weaken existing re-
stricted distribution systems for medicines known to
carry serious risks. Specifically, the bill reads that brand
manufacturers may not “adopt, impose, or enforce any
condition relating to the sale, resale, or distribution of
the covered product, including any condition adopted,
imposed, or enforced as an aspect of a [REMS] that re-
stricts or has the effect of restricting the supply of [the
brand product] to an eligible product developer for de-
velopment or testing purposes [45].”
Moreover, if the FAST Generics Act were enacted, re-
stricted distribution systems that dispense high-risk
medicines only to certified pharmacies, hospitals, or pre-
scribers would be in violation of federal law [45]. The
bill states that REMS cannot prohibit or restrict the sup-
ply of a drug for development and testing purposes by
anyone seeking to prepare a drug marketing application
[45]. Therefore, instead of allowing FDA to determine
when a restricted distribution system is required for the
safe use of a medicine, the proposed legislation would
remove FDA from the process. The only exception
under the FAST Generics Act would be for FDA to cre-
ate a carve-out in the REMS plan that would allow for
distribution to eligible product developers.
The sale of medicines known to carry high risks may not
be limited to generic manufacturers
The bill broadly and ambiguously defines an “eligible
product developer” as “a person that seeks to develop a
[generic drug application] [45].” By this definition, any
individual or business could claim to be an eligible
Worthy Journal of Pharmaceutical Policy and Practice  (2016) 9:2 Page 8 of 12
product developer, including an entity with a history of
failing to follow safety protocols or producing counter-
feit or adulterated medications, as long as the business
or individual intends to file a generic drug application
with FDA.
Compounding the problem, language in the FAST
Generics Act states that a REMS plan may not prohibit
or restrict the brand manufacturer, authorized whole-
saler, or specialty distributor from providing an eligible
product developer with a supply of product for develop-
ment and testing purposes [45]. If this provision were to
go into effect, wholesalers and distributors would be able
to sell large quantities of drug samples essentially to any-
one in the stream of commerce, increasing the likelihood
of diversion and defeating the purpose of ETASU.
To address this serious problem, the bill’s sponsors
added provisions authorizing FDA to prohibit, limit, or
otherwise suspend the sale of a brand drug subject to
REMS requirements to a “product developer” when the
agency determines there would be an imminent hazard
to the public health [45]. This provision would allow
FDA to take action when it is aware that a “product de-
veloper” failed safety protocols in the past or operates
on the black market. However, the proposed legislation
would allow a wholesaler or distributor to sell samples
without revealing the identity of the purchaser to the
brand manufacturer, meaning there may be situations in
which these samples get into the hands of a bad actor,
yet neither FDA nor the brand manufacturer would have
any knowledge of the transfer [45].
Expanded use of shared REMS systems may be impeded
FDA encourages greater use of shared system REMS
when a number of generic versions of a medication re-
quire the same ETASU. This is because each shared
REMS program provides a single web portal to access
medication guides, prescribing information, and other
information, making it easier to simplify patient regis-
tries and prescriber and pharmacist education platforms.
The FAST Generics Act may have the unintended
consequence of hampering expanded use of the single,
shared REMS system. While the bill states no brand
manufacturer “shall take any step that impedes the
prompt development of a single, shared system of
[ETASU],” the proposed legislation fails to define what
constitutes a “step to impede prompt development [45].”
As a result, the time it normally takes for the innovator
company and generic manufacturer to negotiate each
party’s responsibilities to implement a shared REMS sys-
tem could be challenged as “steps to impede prompt de-
velopment.” Moreover, because generic manufacturers
are not liable for the adverse events occurring from use
of their medications under the current liability doctrine,
generic companies will have no incentive to engage in
good faith negotiations with the innovator on operating
a single, shared REMS system.
The proposed legislation would create a lax system
where potentially dangerous drugs may get into the
wrong hands
Acting under the belief that REMS programs block gen-
eric drug development, the FAST Generics Act would
make it unlawful for branded manufacturers to refuse to
sell samples of products subject to REMS controls for
any reason. To that end, the bill gives FDA new author-
ity to compel the branded manufacturer and its whole-
salers or distributors to provide product samples for
bioequivalence testing and place safety conditions on the
generic manufacturer [45]. However, the bill gives FDA a
deadline of 60 days to authorize the forced sale, and if
the agency does not meet this deadline, authorization is
automatic [45]. As a practical matter, 60 days in a very
limited time under any circumstances, let alone one that
may affect the public health by exposing patients to
drugs with serious, known risks.
Regardless of the time limitations, the consequences
for branded manufacturers would be significant. Specif-
ically, an innovator company that fails to comply with
the Act would be treated as if the company violated its
own REMS program [45]. The result could be civil pen-
alties imposed as a REMS violation and legal action
taken by the company or individual requesting samples
seeking injunctive relief and treble damages [45].
Complicating the situation, the proposed legislation
gives generic manufacturers the right to obtain large
quantities of an innovator drug from a wholesaler or dis-
tributor while preventing the brand manufacturer from
learning the identity of the company or individual re-
ceiving quantities of the innovator’s drug [45]. Under the
bill, the wholesaler or distributor would only be allowed
to inform a brand manufacturer that a request for prod-
uct samples had been received. Therefore, brand manu-
facturers will have no way to comply with REMS
requirements to monitor and track the use of high risk
medicines while wholesalers and distributors will feel
free to do business with any party that offers adequate
consideration for drug samples under the guise of an eli-
gible product developer.
The proposed legislation would weaken existing systems
to monitor and track the use of high risk medicines
In addition to contravening existing intellectual property
and antitrust laws, which state that a manufacturer is
free “to exercise his own independent discretion as to
parties with whom we will deal,” the proposed FAST
Generics Act will create a detrimental environment for
the future development and marketing of higher-risk
Worthy Journal of Pharmaceutical Policy and Practice  (2016) 9:2 Page 9 of 12
drugs, especially to treat rare disorders, due to liability
concerns.
Although the bill contains a provision exempting the
brand manufacturer from liability if individuals are
harmed by the failure of the generic drug developer to
implement REMS safety protocols, in reality, it would be
difficult, if not impossible, to assign responsibility for
harm, resulting in both reputational and financial dam-
age to the brand manufacturer [45]. Moreover, the
provision does not address any liability the brand manu-
facturer may face after the bioequivalence testing period
is over, especially because the bill opens up the chain of
distribution with the risk that potentially dangerous
drugs will get into the wrong hands and cause serious
adverse effects. In such a case, the branded manufac-
turer may face liability for harm suffered by patients,
harm to its reputation, and the possibility that its drug
will be taken off the market all because existing drug
safety precautions under REMS were not in effect.
The future supply of generic medicines depends on
policies that encourage, not discourage, the development
of new therapies. For this reason, policies that would
undermine long-standing intellectual property protec-
tions by forcing the sale of branded drug products from
one company to another are not in the public interest.
Furthermore, there is legal precedent for liability chal-
lenges against innovator companies if medication errors
are linked to generic forms of high-risk drugs and bio-
logics [52]. Even though an increasing number of courts
are declining to hold branded manufacturers liable for
injuries allegedly caused by generic-equivalent drugs, le-
gislative proposals now being considered could open the
door to a wave of liability suits because generic devel-
opers are not required to follow the same rigorous con-
trols to ensure the safe use of high-risk medicines as
innovator companies. If this were to happen, there
would be a chilling effect on the development and mar-
keting of new drugs subject to REMS restrictions in the
future.
Recommendations: FDA must preserve ETASU as a
component of REMS
Today, the REMS program envisioned by Congress and
implemented by FDA has become an essential tool to
advance patient safety, protect public health, and provide
access to innovative medicines that would otherwise not
be available. In the years that the REMS program has
been in effect, it has evolved to mitigate the risks of only
the most potentially dangerous drugs. As a result, REMS
programs are rare and only authorized by FDA to pre-
vent life-threatening complications, birth defects, severe
allergic reactions, and infections resulting from the in-
appropriate use or handling of higher risk drugs.
Yet, legislative proposals under consideration in the
114th Congress to force the sale of medicines carry-
ing serious risks to generic marketers for bioequiva-
lence testing could significantly weaken the drug
safety protections REMS makes possible. Although
the goal of speeding the development of less expen-
sive generic medicines is laudable, bills such as the
FAST Generics Act would gut existing safety mea-
sures and increase the risk to public health by making
it easier for potentially dangerous drugs to get into
the wrong hands by:
 Strongly undermining existing restricted distribution
systems for medicines known to carry known
serious risks.
 Defining an eligible product developer able to obtain
high-risk branded medicines as any person or entity
that seeks to develop a generic drug.
 Allowing wholesalers and distributors to sell large
quantities of drug samples without safety
precautions.
 Preventing brand manufacturers from learning the
identity of the company or individual receiving the
company’s drug and, therefore, impeding the
manufacturer’s ability to monitor and track the use
of this potentially dangerous medicine.
 Allowing FDA limited time to authorize the forced
sale of drug samples to “eligible product developers.”
If the agency is not able to act in time, authorization
would be automatic.
Guided by the need to prevent harmful exposure to
medicines that can cause harmful birth defects, organ
damage, and even death when not handled and adminis-
tered with the utmost care, policy makers must exercise
great caution when considering changes to the current
REMS program. Accordingly, policies that would allow
the forced sale of drugs known to carry high risks with-
out required safeguards to ensure these medicines are
handled and administered safely are not in the public
interest and should not be implemented.
However, guarding patient safety and increasing gen-
eric drug development are mutually exclusive. Therefore,
policy makers must take steps to preserve REMS safe-
guards while encouraging the development of policies
that make it easier for brand manufacturers to negotiate
with generic companies based on certain agreed upon
responsibilities and liabilities under FDA’s continued
oversight. To achieve these important goals, a policy
framework should:
 Recognize the need for REMS programs to ensure
continued patient access to innovative, higher risk
medicines.
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 Preserve REMS programs using ETASU, including
restricted distribution systems, when necessary to
mitigate the risks of potentially dangerous drugs.
 Hold all drug manufacturers – branded and generic
– to the same safety requirements when designing
and conducting drug studies, including
bioequivalence testing.
 Allow brand and generic manufacturers to negotiate
the terms under which product samples are
provided for bioequivalence testing.
 Preserve the intellectual property rights of innovator
companies when implementing REMS policies.
Conclusion
REMS are necessary to make medications with known
severe risks available to certain patient populations for
whom treatment may not be available otherwise. FDA
only requires REMS with restricted distribution for med-
ications that would otherwise not be allowed on the
market due to their risks, and only a small number of
medications are subject to REMS with restricted distri-
bution. In order to ensure proper safety measures are
preserved and medications with known risks are not
diverted to parties who will not follow safety require-
ments, legislation should not be passed to require a
forced sale of drugs subject to REMS with restricted dis-
tribution for bioequivalence testing purposes. Generic
manufacturers must be held to the same REMS safety
standards as brand manufacturers. Systems currently in
place adequately balance risk and safety.
Endnotes
1Note that the FDA proposed a rule to allow generic
manufacturers to update product labeling to reflect
newly acquired safety information even if the updated
language differs from the innovator drug, and distribute
the product with differing labeling upon submission to
the FDA of a “changes being effected” (CBE-o) supple-
ment. Under the rule, it is possible that a generic manu-
facturer may face liability for adverse events that occur
while the generic drug has different labeling from its in-
novator drug. The FDA is expected to issue the final rule
in September 2015.
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